Downfall of Political Question Doctrine and Rise of Judicial Self-Restraint in the Judicial Arena: A Case-based Approach

Abstract

This article aims at examining the justifiability of the political question doctrine while adjudicating political litigations in the light of constitutional dictation as well as exploring the rise of the principle of judicial self-restraint as an alternative to the doctrine for determining what cases are to be taken into cognizance albeit political in nature and what cases the court should refrain from investigation and trial and leave to the domain of the other branches of the government. The study method applied is the analysis of secondary materials like books, journal articles and research reports and papers of major reputable institutions working on political questions. The study points out that in earlier times the political question doctrine applied frequently by the courts so as to exclude from its jurisdiction political cases altogether. But nowadays, the judiciary has given up this rigid practice of non-interference with the policy decisions. At the same time, it also finds out that currently the courts are inflicting the principle of judicial self-restraint to repeal or wipe out any statutes on the ground of its being impractical or unconstitutional. Although in such circumstances fresh laws or policies are to be made by the executive or legislative organs of the government. Finally, it concludes by saying that for the smooth adjudication of political cases there is no need to make the political question doctrine justifiable instead the principle of judicial self- restraint could serve the best purpose.